Since the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, the Turkish Central Bank has quietly sold over $35 billion in reserves to stabilize the lira and contain capital flight. But this isn’t mere economic firefighting. Starved of domestic confidence and foreign capital, the ruling Justice and Devleopment Party is now using diplomacy as crisis management — auctioning influence and geopolitical access to stay afloat.

At home, familiar conspiracies have resurfaced after the Istanbul Mayor’s arrest. Many Turks rushed to speculate that foreign actors, the West in particular, prefer a compliant, autocratic Turkey. Some blamed U.S. for propping up President Erdoğan behind the scenes. They are wrong. The foreign powers Ankara once skillfully played off one another are actually either on hold or disengaged.

Let’s start with Russia. Moscow has not forgiven Ankara for its military supply to Ukraine and for shifting the Syrian battlefield against Bashar al-Assad. At this point, the Kremlin probably sees Turkey less as a partner and more as an unreliable broker of influence. As recent as 2023, Russia appeared to be doing President Erdoğan a favor — quietly agreeing to postpone Turkey’s massive natural gas payments in the run-up to the 2023 elections, easing the burden on Erdoğan’s election economy. But that goodwill has evaporated. The state-controlled Russia Today reports on the Istabul mayor’s arrest extensively, and even the resulting police brutality to which their own reporters were exposed. Their editorial choice betrays the mood in Moscow.

Europe, for its part, has always kept Ankara at arm’s length — and with good reason. President Erdoğan has turned refugee flows into a bargaining chip, frequently threatening to let them cross into Europe. Since then, Bulgaria and Greece increased their border security measures. Accordingly, the payments made to Ankara for dealing with refugees have shrunk from 3 to 1 billion euros. One card President Erdoğan still has against Europe is Turkey’s defense industry, but Greece and Cyprus remain determined to prevent Ankara from accessing European defense funds for common procurement —worth 800 billion euros. Greece’s Prime Minister Mitsotakis already postponed his meeting with Erdoğan in the aftermath of the mayor’s arrest.

Israel, too, is fed up. Prior to the Israel-Gaza conflict, President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Netanyahu were cautiously pursuing a rapprochement. But Erdoğan’s position on Hamas has since alienated Jerusalem, just as Israel strengthens its ties with Azerbaijan — a longtime partner of Ankara. Since October 7, demonstrators in Istanbul linked with radical groups have occasionally targeted office buildings of SOCAR, Azerbaijan’s state oil company. The message is clear — Ankara’s rhetoric vis-a-vis Israel is fraying Turkey’s traditional alliances.

And then there’s the United States. There are whispers of a potential thaw under President Trump, as he has publicly praised Erdoğan as “smart” and “tough.” But anyone familiar with Trump’s language knows such praise is both common and shallow — deployed just as easily for adversaries like Putin and Kim Jong-un. The lavish language should not be mistaken for concrete policy shifts. Washington retains CAATSA sanctions which were imposed under Trump over Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400. Trump’s treatment of Erdoğan remains filtered through U.S. ties to Israel and regional balancing acts.

Some relief may still come from the Gulf, where Ankara has built longtime financial lifelines. But even here, the ground is shifting.

Perhaps the most surprising development is coming from Qatar. A steadfast patron of Erdoğan’s government for over a decade, Doha’s participation in the Greek-led “Iniochos” military exercise — alongside the United States, France, Israel, and others —must have raised eyebrows in Ankara. It was an unmistakable message: Qatar is hedging its bets. And in the background, the Qatargate affair is unfolding in Israel. The investigation continues, but the alleged connections of the Qatari government in Israel must have added yet another layer of discomfort for Ankara.

Another blow came from the United Arab Emirates — once a headline investor in Turkey’s post-election rebound. Its $51 billion investment pledge, announced two years ago, is now faltering as Turkish firms hold firm on valuations and deals stall. “The era of unconditional investments has waned,” one observer noted. Meanwhile, the UAE is spending big elsewhere, including a record $35 billion investment in Egypt. Turkey, by contrast, is watching the Gulf’s petrodollars drift away.

The Saudis continue to work with Turkey in rebuilding Syria, and recent efforts to strengthen defense ties — including reports of a $6 billion arms deal between Ankara and Riyadh — suggest that there is mutual interest in deepening cooperation. Then there is the slumping oil prices. Will the Kingdom’s petrodollars be enough to rebuild Syria and, at the same time, lend a hand to Erdoğan’s embattled government? It’s a question both capitals are likely asking themselves — and the answer remains unclear.

With economic fundamentals crumbling and reserves evaporating, President Erdoğan is scrambling for diplomatic lifelines that once came easily. But trust, like capital, is hard to recover once it’s spent. For a regime used to dealing in leverage, the price of survival may finally be higher than what anyone is willing to pay. And the bidders in this auction for autocracy are no longer lining up.